At most, such claims could relate to biases or processes underlyi

At most, such claims could relate to biases or processes underlying such judgment in a very specific (and unusual) context. Second, while some of our results relate to markers of impartial concern for the greater good in moral contexts that are different from that of sacrificial dilemmas, others investigate such markers within this context. As we reported in Study 2, a tendency to ‘utilitarian’ judgment may in fact be strongly tied to considerations of Bortezomib self-interest

(see also Moore et al., 2008). Several prior studies similarly found that rates of ‘utilitarian’ judgment are strongly influenced by whether they involve sacrificing (or saving) foreigners vs. compatriots ( Swann, Gómez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010), strangers vs. family members

( Petrinovich, O’Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993), and black people vs. white people ( Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009)—let alone animals vs. humans ( Petrinovich, O’Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993). There is thus considerable evidence that judgments standardly designated as ‘utilitarian’ do not in fact aim to impartially maximize the greater good. Finally, as we shall outline below, there is an alternative, simpler account of what drives supposedly ‘utilitarian’ judgment, an account that avoids implausibly attributing to ordinary folk radical moral aims drawn from philosophy. Utilitarianism is the view that the right act is the one that maximizes aggregate well-being, considered from a maximally Vildagliptin selleck chemicals llc impartial perspective that gives equal weight to the interests of all persons, or even all sentient beings (Singer, 1979). This radical and demanding view is the positive core of utilitarianism. Our results suggest that so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are not driven by this utilitarian aim of impartially maximizing aggregate welfare. This is not entirely surprising. It is more plausible that when

individuals endorse sacrificing one person to save five others, they are following, not this demanding utilitarian ideal, but rather the more modest, unremarkable, and ordinary thought that it is, ceteris paribus, morally better to save a greater number ( Kahane, 2012 and Kahane, 2014). That everyday view involves no demanding commitment to always maximize aggregate well-being (e.g. by being willing to sacrifice 1 to save 2, or 50 to save 51) nor—more importantly for our purposes—that we must do so in a maximally impartial manner, taking into equal account even the interests of distant strangers. Utilitarianism also has a negative or critical component. Put simply, this component is just the claim that impartially maximizing aggregate well-being is the whole of morality. What follows from this is that utilitarians must reject any ‘deontological’ moral constraints on the pursuit of their positive aim.

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