As for the putative concatenations at stage (3), relying solely on CCLI to be understood, consider the following example. Wolf stone or stone wolf, uttered by X to Y in the presence of wolves and stones, might be readily understood as a suggestion to throw stones at wolves, assuming that X and/or Y have behaved similarly before and have (roughly) the same interpretations for stone and wolf. Crucially, Wolf stone / stone wolf is interpreted as a compound expression by CCLI alone, and does not presuppose any syntactic constraints

(i.e. grammar). But is speaking adaptive in a situation like this? It would have been more efficient if X just threw stones at wolves and Y imitated X. If the common goal is present in the actual environment, the collaborators need not focus on a joint AZD2281 representation of it before acting ( Gardenfors, 2004).

However, suppose that X has access to stones and Y does not. Then, if X did not start stoning wolves by himself, it would have made sense for Y to say wolf stone. Gärdenfors is arguably correct: the pragmatic aspects of language are the most fundamental from an evolutionary point of view. It is obvious that this kind of communication, though limited, could still contribute to fitness (cf. Jackendoff, 1999 and Jackendoff and Pinker, 2005). Of course, verbal communication would be as likely in situations where immediate action is not required and participants have enough time to commune. Then, stone wolf or wolf Ceritinib cell line field might inform X that Y stoned wolves or Sclareol saw them on the field earlier. Similar examples can be found in, e.g., Bowie, 2008 and Dessalles, 2008. Our conclusions about the utility of CCLI can be divided into two

parts. 1. CCLI are sufficient for the interpretation of complex expressions only insofar as they are consistent and shared, two conditions that are enhanced by cooperation and small group size. 2. The interpretation of complex expressions at stage (3) relies on CCLI alone, as opposed to CCLI and grammar at stage (4). For a long time, at least since the posing of Wallace’s paradox,8 it has been speculated that the mathematical capacity is an offshoot of the language faculty. According to Chomsky, 2010 and Hurford, 1990, number is derivative of language. It seems to be an established fact that exact arithmetic – and, hence, the cognition of N – is mainly dependent on language-specific representations (i.e. the verbal number concept – Dehaene et al., 1999, Nieder, 2005 and Wiese, 2003). For example, exact calculation tasks are dependent on left inferior frontal activation that is also involved in verbal association tasks (Dehaene et al., 1999, Petersen et al., 1988, Vandenberghe et al., 1996 and Wagner et al., 1998).